Some people are such impressive altruists that they seem to us to already be doing more than enough. And yet they see themselves as compelled to do even more. Can our view be reconciled with theirs? Can a moderate view of beneficence's demands be made consistent with a requirement to be ambitiously altruistic? I argue that a reconciliation is possible if we adopt a dynamic view of beneficence, which addresses the pattern that our altruism is required to take over time. This frees up theoretical space for understanding how a moral duty of self-development can intersect with the requirements of beneficence, so that the amount that we are required to sacrifice increases without our beneficence becoming immoderate.
for how much she has been sacrificing. This does not seem to be a morally confused outlook. Instead, it has at least some prima facie plausibility as the correct view for us to adopt.
Reconciling AMBITION and MODERATION is the puzzle that I aim to address. My 4 solution will involve defending a dynamic view of beneficence, which frames the relevant, central questions as concerning what pattern our altruism is required to take over time. Within this framework, I will argue that we are required to develop morally, and increase our sacrifices as we do. This type of dynamic view of beneficence has been defended on the Aristotelian eudaimonist grounds that we have reasons to develop, in order to aim at our own flourishing as virtuous people [Flescher 2003 ]. By contrast, I 5 will argue that the developmental requirement has an instrumental rationale: our reasons to develop morally derive from our goal of doing more to help people in need.
However, the developmental view does not provide a full account of beneficence's demands, until we add a static requirement that we give a bare minimum, regardless of how morally developed we are. So the final view of beneficence that we are left with is variegated, combining a multiplicity of dynamic and static requirements. This was brought to my attention after completing the substance of this essay. 5 consider our intuitions about cases in which agents must act at particular moments. But in addition to knowing which actions are right in specific circumstances, we should also like to know which courses our lives ought to take. This requires investigating ethics dynamically, by considering what we should do over time. For example, the question of how to reconcile one's career with one's family only atypically concerns which specific actions to perform. Instead, it is primarily a matter of how to structure the course of one's life while giving due regard to both concerns. The same is true of beneficence.
Dynamic Beneficence

Much of contemporary ethics is fruitfully investigated
Outside of acute emergencies, the key ethical questions typically concern how to plan one's life.
A dynamic view of beneficence helps us understand an altruistic ambition like
Amy's. If we are in the grip of a static view, and limit our focus to agents' obligations in particular cases, then judging that Amy ought to give more will pressure us into concluding that she is not giving enough. But once we think of beneficence as having a temporal profile, we can distinguish what Amy must do now from what she must do in the future. We can see the AMBITION thesis as capturing the fact that Amy is required to increase her sacrifice over time. This leaves room for the MODERATION thesis, as we can say that Amy is currently sacrificing as much as she is required.
But freeing up theoretical space is one thing; providing good reasons to occupy it, another. How could Amy increase her sacrifice without this being excessively difficult, or suffocating her other worthwhile interests? The answer also lies in a dynamic view of beneficence. When we think about beneficence diachronically, we need not take our characters, abilities or interests as fixed. Instead, someone like Amy can change them to bring her altruism and self-interest into a closer harmony. Indeed, I propose that she would be required to do so, and increase how much she sacrifices. In saying that she is required, I mean that all things considered she has most reason to do so, and that it would be blameworthy for her not to do so (although it may be that this blame can only be voiced by those who have themselves met the requirement in question).
Framing this proposal in terms of a requirement may seem unduly tendentious.
After all, there are less controversial claims that we can make about Amy. For example, we can clearly say that Amy has moral reasons to develop herself and sacrifice more; moreover, we can say that since Amy is an impressive altruist with a particular tendency to act on moral reasons, we could also expect her to do more and hope that she does; in addition, we can say that she would be a better person for doing so, and come closer to a virtuous ideal. Given that we have this rich array of moral claims with which to characterise Amy's situation, why invoke duty and hold that she is required to improve herself and increase her sacrifice? Why not instead say that developing and increasing 6 her sacrifice would be supererogatory -something that would be morally good of her to do, but not required?
In general, whether an option is required or merely supererogatory turns on how the moral reasons for the option stack up against non-moral reasons for alternatives.
Whenever we have an opportunity to help others, we have some moral reason to do so. This explains our general requirement to provide aid at no cost or negligible cost. Of course, some of these moral reasons can be fairly weak. The fact that Amy could delight a child sitting next to her on a plane with a story provides her with only a weak reason for action, and one that is easily outweighed by Amy's inclination not to do so. But the reason's weakness is grounded partly in the fact that a story is a trivial benefit. Not so, when it comes to providing basic necessities like water, food, protection from disease empathise is increased the more that we know about, and pay attention to, others' plights. Consequently, forming habits of inquiring into, and attending to, others' plights would allow us to develop our powers of empathy. To illustrate the benefits both of habitual giving and of habitually attending to others' needs, consider Meira. Meira was raised in a religious community, in which the children were all provided with a penny to put in a charity collecting can at communal celebrations. Meira has cut her ties with the community, but has kept the symbolic practice. Whenever she passes by someone asking for money, she always gives something, even if it is a small amount. Her reasons are that it ensures that she gives regularly and keeps her open to the needs of others, stopping her from turning a blind eye.
Besides acquiring behavioural and affective dispositions, there is a second way to make altruism easier: developing our capacities for will-power. Kant .) So just as a gym-rat can become more physically powerful by using her muscles to lift weights, so someone can increase her will-power by using it to resist temptation. Why would helpful habits and strong will-power facilitate giving more to help others? Partly, these make it more likely that we perform helpful actions and pay attention to others' needs. Also, they would make altruism easier. Outside of the realm of conscious decision-making, performing habitual actions would not be so taxing.
Similarly, if we have strong faculties of will-power, then it will be less strenuous to act contrary to other desires. By analogy, if someone has to make a conscious decision not to eat cheese at each meal, then this regimen may well be highly taxing. On the other hand, if she has engrained a habit of passing on post-prandial cheese, then refraining will be much less of an ordeal. Further, if the cheese-abstainer has strong will-power, then it will not be such a struggle to stick to her resolution, should the thought of cheese arise.
In this way, habituation and strong will-power can help someone keep to a stricter diet without this upgrade being experienced as excessively difficult. The same is true of altruism.
Those forms of moral development work around Herman's constraint that beneficence not be excessively difficult. Now let us turn to Wolf's constraint that beneficence should leave room for other worthwhile interests. To work around this constraint, we can shape our interests over time. We acquire new interests while other interests fade away, and we often develop our interests into new forms. By directing these processes, we can better reconcile our altruism with our own flourishing. First, we can shape our interests towards less expensive forms. We can come to 12 rely less on material comforts, and we can take cost into account when deciding which new activities to engage in. Typically, many different interests could appeal to us, and Chiara Cordelli [manuscript] argues that we have a preventative duty to limit our expected costs of 12 complying with the demands of beneficence, and this requires us to choose less expensive interests. life is too short to take an interest in all that is worthwhile. For example, on a Thailand holiday, we might choose whether to learn how to cook panaeng curry or learn how to scuba-dive. Both interests would be life-enriching, yet by choosing the former, we could free up resources with which to help others. This is not to suppose that our interests are infinitely malleable. For some people, expensive activities like scuba-diving will already be passions, and cannot easily be replaced with alternatives that would bring them the same joy. But others' tastes are more flexible, and they can let expensive interests fall by the wayside, to be replaced by others. Indeed, many altruists gradually lose a taste for expensive pursuits when they reflect on the extent of material inequality.
As well as economising, we can develop interests into forms that benefit others. We Let us bring these points together. We have discovered a catholic list of forms of moral development: habituation, strengthening will-power, developing more economical interests, and developing more altruistic interests. The list's diversity reflects the fact that our moral agency is underpinned by different faculties and the fact that its direction should take account of non-moral values. But the common thread to the list is that these forms of moral development allow us to sacrifice more of our resources to help others, without this sacrifice being excessively difficult or suffocating other worthwhile interests.
In light of our earlier argument, this leads us to the view that beneficence places on us two constraints. First, it pro tanto requires us to develop ourselves morally in these ways. Second, the more morally developed we are, the more that beneficence pro tanto requires us to give. If we like, then we could think of these two requirements in terms 13 of an analogy with learning the high jump. At any particular jump, a novice athlete should aim to clear the bar. But she should also aim to improve over time, and raise the bar higher. Similarly, at any particular time, beneficence requires us to give a certain amount to help others, and also to develop morally. As we become better people, we should increase the amount that we sacrifice to help others. In the long run, the possibility of moral development allows us to marry ambition in altruism with a moderate view of beneficence.
Variable and Fixed Requirements of Beneficence
These are only pro tanto requirements, since there may be countervailing considerations. For example, 13 if one's child developed an expensive illness, then one might legitimately spend less on strangers.
Call the position that beneficence requires us to develop morally and increase how much
we sacrifice the 'developmental view'. It entails that beneficence's demands will vary across times and persons. To see the temporal variation, note that as Amy develops morally, she will be required to give more than she was previously required. As such, I argue that Clara should bear this cost for the following reason. If a cost arises solely as the foreseeable result of someone culpably failing to meet a moral requirement, then all else equal the cost should be paid by that person. To illustrate, suppose Daniela has delayed booking her tickets for a holiday, and the prices have predictably risen. If the delay has foreseeably been caused by her companion's negligence, then her companion ought to offer to pay the additional costs; but if the negligence is Daniela's, then she ought to shoulder the costs herself. The underlying principle is that, all else equal, it is unfair for others to bear the costs of an agent's culpable mistakes, when she could instead internalise these costs herself.
In the case of Clara, she is the person at fault, and so in the absence of a valid excuse, Clara should be the one to pay the cost.
However, it may be that there are reasons why Clara should not be held fully responsible for her previous failure to develop morally. I want to highlight three potential reasons. First, Clara may have changed so much that she is no longer fully responsible for moral failures during her youth. Plausibly, certain forms of psychological continuity undergird the moral responsibility that we have for our past actions. So, the more that we change in these psychological respects, the less responsible that we would be. Second, Clara may have failed to appreciate that she has a duty to develop morally. If so, then her previous moral ignorance may be a partial excuse. In particular, moral ignorance may function as an excuse when the relevant moral truths are difficult to discover and are not yet widely shared in her moral community. Accordingly, Clara might plead that her moral ignorance of the developmental 14 view was not mere negligence on her part; instead, it was an easy mistake to make, and one that is widely made by others. Third, we might think that morality should be lenient towards people who turn over a new leaf. Suppose that Clara has undergone a moral epiphany, and only recently begun to appreciate that she was required to develop her interests. Now that she sees her obligations aright, she has fully resolved to do what she ought. While this change of heart does not absolve her of responsibility for her previous actions, we might think that it provides grounds for not holding her fully responsible for the costs that have resulted from her previous errors. We might think morality should leave room for making a fresh start.
While these considerations each have appeal, they raise issues that are not local to beneficence: these issues arise whenever we must decide whether to be lenient on people who have erred in the past. I am unable to resolve these issues here, and so, I will leave open 15 whether they provide grounds for not holding people fully responsible for their past moral failures. Instead, I will only state the implications for beneficence, on the assumption that these considerations turn out be probative. It is in light of Clara's previous failure to develop morally that her current sacrifice would increase to the level that would be required of her as a developed person. So, to the extent that Clara is excused from her previous failures to develop morally, she is not required to increase her sacrifice in this way. On the other hand, 16 if Clara has no such excuse, then she is morally required to do as 'much good' as she would have done in the counterfactual scenario where she had met all her requirements. In other words, if Clara is fully responsible for failing to develop as much as Amy, and this is the only difference between them, then Clara is still required to sacrifice as much as Amy.
In addition, there is the question of whether we are required to sacrifice more to assist someone when 15 we have previously failed to assist that same person [Barry and Øverland 2014] .
It would matter whether the excuses are fully exculpatory or merely mitigating.
16
Of course, if Clara did sacrifice as much as Amy, then Clara would be foregoing some of her particular interests. Does this mean that we have lost sight of Wolf's insight that beneficence should not be so demanding that we are unable to enjoy our particular interests? I suggest not. There is potency to the complaint that a moral theory is too demanding in virtue of the size of the costs that we would bear when meeting the theory's requirements. Much 17 less powerful is the complaint that a theory is too demanding in virtue of the additional costs that we would bear as a result of failing to meet our requirements. While Clara faces high moral demands, she cannot complain that beneficence is too demanding. After all, beneficence gave her the opportunity to continually pursue interests that appeal to her. To grasp this opportunity, she would have needed to develop her interests over time. But by failing to meet the requirement to develop morally, she failed to grasp this opportunity. That is why she now faces high demands. So we should attribute Clara's need to make these additional sacrifices to her own failures. As a result, she cannot appeal to these additional sacrifices to complain that beneficence is too demanding. 
18
taking risks for moral ends. But the more courageous that we become, the more capacity that we have to perform morally good acts for which courage is an asset. For example, we have reasons to speak out against injustices, even when doing so risks our reputations, our relations with others or other interests of ours. For the sake of these reasons, morality might place on us a requirement to develop into more courageous people. In so far as this is an instrumental rationale for a developmental requirement, it would be analogous to the beneficence-based rationale for the developmental view.
Conclusion
I have argued for a view of beneficence that combines multiple requirements. There is a static requirement that specifies a bare minimum that everyone must meet. In addition, according to the developmental view, we are required to develop morally and increase how much we sacrifice as we do. These dynamic requirements allow us to solve the puzzle with which we began. Let us return to Amy. The developmental view implies that looking forward into the future, Amy ought to be ambitious about how much she gives -she ought to aim to give more then. As such, Amy's ambitious attitude is the correct one for her to take, and so we have validated the AMBITION thesis. Importantly, though, the developmental view allows us to hold that Amy is already giving what she ought now. As such, the view leaves room for the MODERATION thesis, on the grounds that beneficence's demands should not be too difficult or suffocating. We can take these considerations into account as limits both on the rate at which Amy is required to develop and also on the sacrifices that she must make at each stage of her development.
In this way, we can reconcile the AMBITION and MODERATION theses. We have arrived at a moderate view of beneficence, which finds a role for ambition.
